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We investigate the degree of discontinuity of several solution concepts from
non-cooperative game theory. While the consideration of Nash equilibria
forms the core of our work, also pure and correlated equilibria are dealt
with. Formally, we restrict the treatment to two player games, but results
and proofs extend to the n-player case. As a side result, the degree of dis-
continuity of solving systems of linear inequalities is settled.
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1. Introduction
Both for applications and theoretical considerations, the algorithmic task of computing
Nash equilibria from certain representations of games is of immense importance. A
natural mathematical formulation of game theory uses the real numbers for payoffs
and for mixed strategies, while classical models for algorithms require a restriction to
countable sets. By imposing suitable restrictions and modifications to obtain countable
problems, the complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium for a normal form game was
proven to be PPAD-complete ([1], [2]).
Here we will use another approach: Instead of limiting the problem, we will extend
the theory of computation. While the TTE-framework ([3]) is perfectly capable of for-
mulating the task of computing Nash equilibria from normal form games, we will see
that even the most trivial cases are discontinuous, and hence not computable.
To gain a deeper understanding of the problem, its degree of discontinuity will be
studied. Mirroring an approach in the study of game theory using classical computational
complexity, we will also examine other solution concepts such as correlated equilibria.
While correlated equilibria seem to be computationally easier than Nash equilibria1,
1In [4] several decision problems regarding Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria were compared,
most of them turned out to be NP-hard for Nash equilibria and to be in P for correlated equilibria.
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we will prove that both concepts share a degree of discontinuity. Limitation to pure
strategies yields a strictly less discontinuous problem, the classical problem can be solved
by a cubic algorithm2.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Game Theory
An n×m bi-matrix game is simply given by two n×m real valued matrices A and B.
Two players simultaneously pick an index, row player chooses an i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and
column player chooses an j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Row player gets Aij as a reward, column
player gets Bij . We consider several solution concepts defined as equilibria, where no
player has an incentive to change her strategy unilaterally.
Definition 1. A pure equilibrium for a n ×m bi-matrix game (A,B) is a pair (i, j) ∈
{1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . ,m} satisfying Aij ≥ Akj for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and Bij ≥ Bil for all
l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
As pure equilibria do not exist for all games, a more general notion is introduced. If
both players can randomize independently over their actions, one is led to the definition
of an m-mixed strategy as an m-dimensional real valued vector s with non-negative
coefficients and
m∑
j=1
sj = 1. The set of m-mixed strategies will be denoted by S
m.
Definition 2. A Nash equilibrium for an n×m bi-matrix game (A,B) is a pair (xˆ, yˆ) ∈
Sn × Sm satisfying xˆTAyˆ ≥ xTAyˆ for all x ∈ Sn and xˆTByˆ ≥ xˆTBy for all y ∈ Sm.
If (xˆ, yˆ) is a Nash equilibrium, again neither of the players can improve her payoff
by changing her mixed strategy unilaterally. A famous result by John Nash ([7]) es-
tablished that Nash equilibria in bi-matrix games always exist. By identifying a pure
strategy with the mixed strategy that puts weight 1 on it, pure equilibria can be con-
sidered a special case of Nash equilibria. An even more general solution concept can be
obtained by allowing the individual player’s randomization processes to be correlated
([8]).
Definition 3. A correlated equilibrium for a n × m bi-matrix game is a real valued
n×m matrix C with non-negative entries and
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Cij = 1 so that
m∑
j=1
AijCij ≥
m∑
j=1
AljCij
2There are, however, several interesting hardness results for finding pure equilibria in games ([5], [6]),
originating in other representations or requiring additional properties.
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holds for all i, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and
n∑
i=1
BijCij ≥
n∑
i=1
BikCij
holds for all j, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Given a Nash equilibrium (x, y), a correlated equilibrium can be constructed as Cij =
xiyj, while each correlated equilibrium of this form can be obtained from a Nash equi-
librium, allowing us to consider Nash equilibria as special cases of correlated equilibria.
Thus, finding a correlated equilibrium has to be easier than finding a Nash equilibrium,
as we just presented a reduction.
Another way of creating an easier problem consists in a restriction of the games used.
A zero-sum game is a bi-matrix game of the form (A,−A).
2.2. Representing Games
In order to consider games as inputs to Type-2-Machines, they have to be coded into
infinite sequences. The choice of the countable alphabet used is irrelevant for the theory,
to simplify proofs we will use either {0, 1} or N, depending on the context. The degrees of
discontinuity we study are those of the realizations, that is of functions turning names of
instances into names of solutions. Since all occurring representations will be admissible,
topological properties carry over between sets of games and sets of names for games, etc.
As games in normal form are pairs of real matrices, and (possible) equilibria pairs of
real vectors (or again real matrices), one can quickly derive suitable representations by
using product and coproduct representations ([3], [9]), starting from any representation
of the real numbers.
The standard representation ρ of the real numbers is chosen for various reasons; it is
admissible and provides a convincing class of computable functions, in contrast to some
of the alternatives ([3], [10]). Additionally, as demonstrated in [11], the representation ρ
is equivalent to the representation naturally arising for the results of repeated physical
measurements. For defining ρ, we fix a bijection ν : N → Q with ν(0) = 0, so that all
the usual operations on Q are computable w.r.t. ν.
Definition 4. Let ρ(w) = x ∈ R hold for w ∈ NN, if |ν(w(i)) − x| ≤ 2−i holds for all
i ∈ N.
Definition 5. Let w be a Γ-name for the bi-matrix game (A,B), if
1. w = 0n1m0w2, when (A,B) is an n×m game
2. w2 = 〈w
a, wb〉, where 〈 〉 denotes the usual pairing function
3. wa = 〈wa11, . . . w
a
n1, w
a
12, . . . , w
a
nm〉
4. wb = 〈wb11, . . . w
b
n1, w
b
12, . . . , w
b
nm〉
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5. ρ(waij) = Aij
6. ρ(wbij) = Bij
Representations for pure, Nash and correlated equilibria can be derived in the same
fashion. Detailed definitions are omitted here.
2.3. Comparing Discontinuity
As games can have multiple equilibria, we do not consider a function assigning an equi-
librium to each game, but rather a multi-valued function. We will identify a multi-valued
functions with the set of its choice functions. To compare the discontinuity of such sets,
Type-2-Reducibility as studied in e.g. ([13], [14], [15], [16], [24], [17], [9]) is used, as well
as the Level of a function (or a set of functions), introduced in [16].
We use the following definition of Type-2-Reducibility:
Definition 6. Let A,B be multi-valued functions. Then A ≤2 B holds, iff there are
continuous partial functions F , G with w 7→ F (w, g(G(w))) ∈ A for each g ∈ B.
As demonstrated in [9] (for suprema) and [12] (for infima), ≤2 induces a completely
distributive complete lattice. We use ⌈Pn⌉n∈N to denote the supremum of a countable
family (Pn)n∈N. This allows to consider the degree of discontinuity of finding equilibria
in any game as the supremum of the degrees of discontinuity of finding equilibria in
games with fixed size.
As the Level will play only a minor role in our considerations, we refer to [9] for
definitions.
3. Single Player Games and Pure Equilibria
From the perspective of game theory, single player games are trivial: The acting player
chooses whatever action is best for her. As a discrete computation problem, this amounts
to finding a maximum in a list of integers, a task that can be solved in linear time or
logarithmic space. As the problem posed over the reals is discontinuous, we will study
the problems 1Puren and 1Pure of finding pure equilibria in single player games with
n actions and without fixed game sizes. It shall be noted that single player games can
be identified with n× 1 bi-matrix games, justifying their inclusion.
As every n × 1 bi-matrix game has a pure equilibrium, and Cij > 0 can only hold in
a correlated equilibrium C, if the entry Ai1 is maximal in A (and thus (i, 1) is a pure
equilibrium), finding pure, Nash and correlated equilibria is equivalent for single player
games, so the restriction to pure equilibria does not invoke any loss of generality.
The degree of discontinuity of 1Puren turns out to be equivalent to another family of
problems, MLPOn, introduced in [13] as generalizations of the lesser limited principle
of omniscience (LPO) studied in constructive mathematics ([18]).
Definition 7. A function f : {(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ (NN)n | ∃i ≤ n pi = 0N} → {1, 2, . . . , n} is
in MLPOn, if it fulfills pf(p1,p2,...,pn) = 0
N for all valid
(p1, p2, ..., pn).
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Theorem 8. MLPOn ≡2 1Puren
Proof. First, we present a reduction from MLPOn to 1Puren. The n input bands for
MLPOn can individually be translated to the n relevant input bands for 1Puren. As
long as 0 is read, the rational number 0 will be printed. If another number is read in
the ith step for the first time, print the rational number −2i+1 from now on. All bands
containing 0N will be translated to a ρ-name of 0, and all other bands to a ρ-name of a
negative number, so a pure equilibrium corresponds to a 0-entry.
For the other direction, all input values have to be compared. As long as no contra-
diction for the assumption that the ith value is the largest one has been found, 0 will be
printed on the ith output tape. If contradiction is found, print 1. Then an output tape
contains 0N, if the corresponding input tape contains a ρ-name of a maximal entry.
In the next step, we extend the scope of consideration to finding pure equilibria in
arbitrary bi-matrix games. The relevant problems are Purenm, where the size of the
game is restricted to n×m, and the general case denoted by Pure. For obtaining results,
reducibility to MLPOn shall be expressed by a partition property:
Lemma 9. Let H be a multi-valued function defined on a strongly zero-
dimensional metrisable space3 X. Then H ≤2 MLPOn holds, iff there are n closed
sets Ai, i ≤ n with X =
n⋃
i=1
Ai, so that for each i ≤ n, there is an f
i ∈ H so that f i|Ai is
continuous.
Proof. Assume H ≤2 MLPOn, so there are continuous F , G with
x 7→ F (x, g(G(x))) ∈ H for all g ∈ MLPOn. Let the ith component of G be de-
noted by Gi. Consider G
−1
i (0
N). As Gi is continuous, this set is closed. There is
a function g¯ ∈ MLPOn, so that for x ∈ G
−1
i (0
N), g¯(G(x)) = i holds. Thus, if
x 7→ F (x, g¯(G(x))) ∈ H is restricted to G−1i (0
N), it is equal to x 7→ F (x, i), and therefore
it is continuous. As there is an i with Gi(x) = 0
N for each x ∈ X, X =
n⋃
i=1
G−1i (0
N)
holds, completing the first part of the proof.
For the other direction, note that for each closed subsetA of a strongly zero-dimensional
metrisable spaceX, there is a continuous function dA : X → {0, 1}
N with A = d−1A ({0
N}).
Given sets Ai, i ≤ n as specified above, consider the function D : X → ({0, 1}
N)n de-
fined through D(x)(i) = dAi(x). Further, define a continuous function F on the set
n⋃
i=1
Ai × {i} through F (x, i) = f
i
|Ai
(x), where f i ∈ H is a function that is continuous
when restricted to Ai. As H is a multi-valued function, x 7→ F (x, g(D(x))) is in H for
each g ∈MLPOn.
Theorem 10. Purenm ≤2 MLPOn∗m.
3Examples for such spaces are {0, 1}N and NN with their standard topologies. A brief characterization
of strongly zero-dimensional metrisable spaces can be found in [9], for details we refer to [16] and
[19].
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Proof. Given an n ×m bi-matrix game (A,B), the condition for the pair (i, j) to be a
pure equilibrium is Aij ≥ Akj and Bij ≥ Bil for all k ≤ n, l ≤ m. This implies that the
set P ijnm = {(A,B) | (i, j) is an equilibrium of (A,B)} ⊆ Rnm × Rnm is closed. Due to
the admissibility of Γ, the set of corresponding names for the games is also closed. As
the set of n ×m bi-matrix games which have a pure strategy equilibrium is the union⋃
i≤n,j≤m
P ijnm, an application of Lemma 9 yields the claim.
Corollary 11. 1Pure ≡2 Pure.
Proof. As both problems are the respective limits, considering Theorems 8 and 10 is
sufficient.
The same reasoning used to establish the equivalence of finding pure strategies in 1
player games and in 2 player games can directly be extended to any finite number of
players. While Nash and correlated equilibria have the same degree of discontinuity as
pure equilibria in single player games, we will continue to show that a higher degree of
discontinuity emerges in the two player case.
4. Nash and correlated equilibria in bi-matrix games
We will now consider Nash and correlated equilibria in bi-matrix games. The problems
Corrnm and Nashnm are the fixed size versions, Corr and Nash the general problems.
An additional dimension of the problem is whether the games are zero-sum, yielding
the problems ZCorrnm, ZNashnm and the corresponding general problems. Straight-
forward reasoning yields the reductions:
ZCorrnm ≤2 Corrnm ≤2 Nashnm ZCorrnm ≤2 ZNashnm ≤2 Nashnm
4.1. The discontinuity of robust division
Similar toMLPOn being representative of the kind of discontinuity we face when search-
ing for pure equilibria, we will start with considering division, which will turn out to be
typical for correlated and Nash equilibria. Computing a
b
given two real numbers a, b 6= 0
is continuous, of course. However, testing whether b 6= 0 is not. A robust variant of
division, which accepts division by zero and returns an arbitrary value, is not continuous
anymore:
Definition 12. Let rDiv be the set of functions d defined on
{(u, v) | 0 ≤ ρ(u) ≤ ρ(v)} satisfying ρ(d(u, v)) = ρ(u)
ρ(v) for ρ(v) > 0.
While Lev(rDiv) = 2 establishes robust division as an only slightly discontinuous
problem, the following result shows that robust division introduces a new kind of dis-
continuity not present in finding pure equilibria.
Theorem 13. rDiv 2 Pure.
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Proof. We assume rDiv ≤2 1Pure, due to Corollary 11. This implies the existence
of continuous functions F , G, L so that for each E ∈ 1Pure the function dE defined
through dE(u, v) = F (u, v,E(0
L(u,v)101G(u, v))) is in rDiv. Informally, L chooses the
size of the game, G gives the game and F uses a maximal value of the game to derive
the result.
We consider n = L(0N, 0N). As L is continuous, the set L−1({n}) is open and closed,
so it contains an open environment of (0N, 0N). Especially there is a k ∈ N with 0kNN×
0kNN ⊆ L−1({n}). We note ρ(u)
ρ(v) =
ρ(0ku)
ρ(0kv)
where ν(u(i)) = ν(u(i)) ∗ 2−k−1 and ν(v(i)) =
ν(v(i)) ∗ 2−k−1. Thus we obtain rDiv ≤2 1Puren.
According to Lemma 9, rDiv ≤2 1Puren implies the existence of n closed sets Ai so
that for each i there is an fi ∈ rDiv so that fi restricted to Ai is continuous. If there is
an l with (0N, 0N) /∈ Al, then there is a k ∈ N with (0kNN × 0kNN) ∩ Al = ∅, so with a
repetition of the argument used above we can conclude rDiv ≤2 1Puren−1. Thus we
can assume (0N, 0N) ∈ Al for all l ≤ n.
For l ≤ n+ 1 we define a sequence (wlk)k∈N of sequences through w
l
k(i) = 0 for i ≤ k
and ν(wlk(i)) = (l2
k)−1 for i > k. Furthermore, define the sequence (vk)k∈N of sequences
through vk(i) = 0 for i ≤ k and vk(i) = 2
−k for i > k. For each sequence (wlk, vk) there
must be an l′ so that Al′ contains an infinite subsequence (w
l
k, vk) of (w
l
k, vk). As there
are n + 1 sequences and n sets, the pigeonhole principle ensures that there is a set Ai
containing the sequences (wl1k , vk) and (w
l2
k , vk).
Now observe lim
k→∞
(wl1k , vk) = lim
k→∞
(wl2k , vk) = (0
N, 0N), but fi(w
l1
k , vk) = l
−1
1 6= l
−1
2 =
fi(w
l2
k , vk). Thus, the restriction of fi to Ai is not continuous in (0
N, 0N), yielding a
contradiction to the assumption.
We will now use modifications of the game matching pennies as a gadget to implement
divisions in a game.
A =
(
a 0
0 b
)
B = −A MP (a, b) = (A,B)
If both a > 0 and b > 0, the unique correlated equilibrium is obtained from the unique
Nash equilibrium x = y = ( b
a+b ,
a
a+b ). If a = 0, b > 0, then (x, y) is an equilibrium, iff
y = (1, 0), and for a > 0, b = 0 we have y = (0, 1).
Theorem 14. rDiv ≤2 ZCorr22
Proof. Given a pair of ρ-names for real numbers a, b with 0 ≤ a ≤ b, a name for the
game MP (a, b − a) can be computed. A correlated equilibrium C of MP (a, b − a) has
the form:
C =
(
c11 c12
c21 c22
)
=
(
xy x(1− y)
(1− x)y (1− x)(1− y)
)
Thus, one can obtain c11 + c21 = y =
a
b
for b > 0.
Theorem 14 in conjunction with Theorem 13 implies ZCorr22 2 Pure, so even the
simplest case of finding mixed strategies is not reducible to finding pure strategies. The
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problem rDiv itself cannot capture the discontinuity of finding Nash equilibria, due to
Lev(ZNash22) = 4 (s. Subsection 5.2), compelling us to derive a sequence of problems
with increasing level from rDiv.
4.2. Products of Problems and Products of Games
The product of functions can be considered as computing all of them in parallel. This will
allow us to specify exactly the degree of discontinuity of problems solvable by multiple
robust divisions, once we defined products for multi-valued functions. The following
definitions and results on the products of multi-valued functions and their discontinuity
extend corresponding results from [17].
Definition 15. For functions f : X → Y , g : U → V , define 〈f, g〉 : (X ×U)→ (Y ×V )
through 〈f, g〉(x, u) = (f(x), g(u)). Define 〈f〉1 = f and 〈f〉n+1 = 〈f, 〈f〉n〉.
Definition 16. For relations P , Q, define 〈P,Q〉 = {〈f, g〉 | f ∈ P, g ∈ Q}. Define
〈P 〉 = P and 〈P 〉n+1 = 〈P, 〈P 〉n〉.
⌈P,Q⌉ ≤2 〈P,Q〉 holds, but the converse is false in general. If f ≤2 g holds, then
also 〈f, h〉 ≤2 〈g, h〉. As 〈 〉 is associative, it can be extended to any finite number of
arguments in the standard way. There is a useful distributive law for ⌈ ⌉ and 〈 〉 which
we will state as 〈P, ⌈Qi⌉i∈N〉 ≡2 ⌈〈P,Qi〉⌉i∈N.
For games, our notion of a product will be inspired by the model of playing two
independent games at once. This will allow us to establish a link between products
of relations and products of games. We will use [ ] to denote a bijection between
{1, 2, . . . , n} × {1, 2, . . . ,m} and {1, 2, . . . , nm} for suitable n, m.
Definition 17. Given an n1 ×m1 bi-matrix game (A
1, B1) and an n2 ×m2 bi-matrix
game (A2, B2), we define the (n1n2)×(m1m2) product game (A
1, B1)×(A2, B2) as (A,B)
with A[i1,i2][j1,j2] = A
1
i1j1
+ A2i2j2 and
B[i1,i2][j1,j2] = B
1
i1j1
+B2i2j2 .
The product of games nicely commutes with the notions from game theory used in
this paper, as will be established by the following theorems. A slight exception holds
for the zero-sum property: A zero-sum game can always be expressed as the product of
two constant-sum games which are not zero-sum. However, as a constant-sum game can
always be normalized to an equivalent zero-sum game, this is not problematic for our
purposes.
For simplifying notation, in the following theorems and their proofs, (A,B) always
abbreviates (A1, B1)× (A2, B2).
Theorem 18. (A,B) is constant-sum, if and only if both (A1, B1) and (A2, B2) are
constant-sum.
Proof. Assume that (A1, B1) and (A2, B2) are constant-sum, that is Akij + B
k
ij = c
k for
k ∈ {1, 2} and all i, j. Then we have
A[i1,i2][j1,j2] +B[i1,i2][j1,j2] = A
1
i1j1
+A2i2j2 +B
1
i1j1
+B2i2j2 = c
1 + c2
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for all i1, i2, j1, j2, so (A,B) is also a constant-sum game.
For the other direction, we assume w.l.o.g. that (A1, B1) is not constant-sum, so there
are i1, j1, k1, l1 with A
1
i1,j1
+B1i1,j1 6= A
1
k1,l1
+B1k1,l1 . Then we have:
A[i1,1],[j1,1] +B[i1,1],[j1,1] = A
1
i1,j1
+B1i1,j1 +A
2
1,1 +B
2
1,1
6= A1k1,l1 +B
1
k1,l1
+A21,1 +B
2
1,1 = A[k1,1],[l1,1] +B[k1,1],[l1,1]
Thus, the product (A,B) is not constant-sum.
Theorem 19. If (ik, jk) is a pure equilibrium of (A
k, Bk) for k ∈ {0, 1}, if and only if
([i1, i2], [j1, j2]) is a pure equilibrium of (A,B).
Proof. The proof is done by contraposition. Assume w.l.o.g. that iˆ1 is a better response
to j1 than i1, that is A
1
iˆ1,j1
> A1i1,j1 . Then we also have A[ˆi1,i2],[j1,j2] > A[i1,i2],[j1,j2], so if
(i1, j1) is not a Nash equilibrium, then ([i
1, i2], [j1, j2]) cannot be one either.
If, on the other hand, [ˆi1, iˆ2] is a better response against [j1, j2] than [i1, i2], then
we have A1
iˆ1,j1
+ A2
iˆ2,j2
> A1i1,j1 + A
2
i2,j2
. Obviously, this contradicts the conjunction of
A1i1,j1 ≥ A
1
iˆ1,j1
and A2i2,j2 ≥ A
2
iˆ2,j2
.
Theorem 20. If (xk, yk) is a Nash equilibrium of (Ak, Bk) for both k ∈ {0, 1}, then
(x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B), where x[i1i2] = x
1
i1
x2i2 and y[m1m2] = y
1
m1
y2m2 .
Proof. We will prove that x is a best response to y, if xk is a best response to yk for
both k ∈ {0, 1}, the remaining part is analogous. By applying the following equivalence
transformation
(n1n2)∑
o=1
(m1m2)∑
p=1
xoAo,pyp
=
n1∑
o1=1
n2∑
o2=1
m1∑
p1=1
m2∑
p2=1
x[o1,o2]A[o1,o2],[p1,p2]y[p1,p2]
=
n1∑
o1=1
n2∑
o2=1
m1∑
p1=1
m2∑
p2=1
x1o1x
2
o2
(A1o1,p1 +A
2
o2,p2
)y1p1y
2
p2
=
[
n1∑
o1=1
m1∑
p1=1
xo1A
1
o1,p1
yp1
(
n2∑
o2=1
xo2
)(
m2∑
p2=1
yp2
)]
+
[
n2∑
o2=1
m2∑
p2=1
xo2A
2
o2,p2
yp2
(
n1∑
o1=1
xo1
)(
m1∑
p1=1
yp1
)]
=
[
n1∑
o1=1
m1∑
p1=1
xo1A
1
o1,p1
yp1
]
+
[
n2∑
o2=1
m2∑
p2=1
xo2A
2
o2,p2
yp2
]
on both sides of the best response condition
n1n2∑
o=1
m1m2∑
p=1
xoAo,pyp ≥
n1n2∑
o=1
m1m2∑
p=1
xˆoAo,pyp
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one obtains the form for the best response condition:[
n1∑
o1=1
m1∑
p1=1
xo1A
1
o1,p1
yp1
]
+
[
n2∑
o2=1
m2∑
p2=1
xo2A
2
o2,p2
yp2
]
≥[
n1∑
o1=1
m1∑
p1=1
xˆo1A
1
o1,p1
yp1
]
+
[
n2∑
o2=1
m2∑
p2=1
xˆo2A
2
o2,p2
yp2
]
As this is just the sum of the best response conditions for the individual games (A1, B2)
and (A2, B2), the claim follows.
Theorem 21. If (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B), then (x1, y1) given by x1i =
n2∑
l=1
x[i,l] and y
1
j =
m2∑
l=1
y[j,l] is a Nash equilibrium of (A
1, B1).
Proof. Again the proof uses contraposition. Assume w.l.o.g. that xˆ1 is a better response
against y1 than x1, that is:
n1∑
o=1
m1∑
p=1
xˆ1oA
1
o,py
1
p >
n1∑
o=1
m1∑
p=1
x1oA
1
o,py
1
p
Add
n2∑
o=1
m2∑
p=1
x2oA
2
o,py
2
p on both sides, and apply the reverse of the transformation used in
the proof of Theorem 20. Then one obtains:
n1n2∑
o=1
m1m2∑
p=1
xˆoAo,pyp >
n1n2∑
o=1
m1m2∑
p=1
xˆoAo,pyp
with xˆ defined via xˆ[o1,o2] = xˆ
1
o1
x2o2 . This contradicts the assumption that x would be a
best response against y, so (x, y) cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 22. If Ck is a correlated equilibrium for (Ak, Bk) for both k ∈ {0, 1}, then a
correlated equilibrium of (A,B) is given by C, defined via C[i1,i2],[j1,j2] = C
1
i1,j1
C2i2,j2 .
Proof. We show the claim only for the condition for the first player, the second player’s
condition is dealt with in the same way. We add the inequalities
mk∑
jk=1
AkikjkC
k
ikjk
≥
mk∑
jk=1
AklkjkC
k
ikjk
holding for all ik, lk for both k ∈ {0, 1} to arrive at:
m1∑
j1=1
A1i1j1C
1
i1j1
+
m2∑
j2=1
A2i2j2C
2
i2j2
≥
m1∑
j1=1
A1l1j1C
1
i1j1
+
m2∑
j2=1
A2l2j2C
2
i2j2
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Taking into consideration
nk∑
ik=1
mk∑
jk=1
Ckikjk = 1 for both k ∈ {0, 1}, and summing over all
free variables, this can be expanded to:
n1∑
i1=1
m1∑
j1=1
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
(
A1i1j1C
1
i1j1
C2i2j2 +A
2
i2j2
C1i1j2C
2
i2j2
)
≥
n1∑
i1=1
m1∑
j1=1
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
(
A1l1j1C
1
i1j1
C2i2j1 +A
2
l2j2
C1i1j1C
2
i2j2
)
Application of the definition of C and A yields:
n1∑
i1=1
m1∑
j1=1
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
A[i1,i2],[j1,j2]C[i1,i2],[j1,j2] ≥
n1∑
i1=1
m1∑
j1=1
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
A[l1,l2],[j1,j2]C[i1,i2],[j1,j2]
As [ ] is bijective, this is the condition we needed to prove.
Theorem 23. If C is a correlated equilibrium for (A,B), then a correlated equilibrium
of (A1, B1) can be obtained by C1i1,j1 =
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
C[i1,i2],[j1,j2].
Proof. The result is obtained by reversal of the proof of Theorem 22.
As the product game can be computed from the constituent games, we can use the
properties of the products of games to obtain the following results regarding the problem
of finding equilibria:
Theorem 24. Let Game ∈ {Pure,ZCorr,ZNash,Corr,Nash}. Then
〈Gamenm,Gamekl〉 ≤2 Game(nk),(ml).
Theorem 25. Let Game ∈ {Pure,ZCorr,ZNash,Corr,Nash}. Then
〈Game〉n ≡2 Game for all n ∈ N.
Proof. We prove the claim for n = 2, the remaining part is done by induction. Game ≤2
〈Game,Game〉 is trivial. Now observe Game = ⌈Gamenm⌉n,m∈N and use the distribu-
tive law twice, yielding
〈Game,Game〉 ≡2 ⌈〈Gamenm,Gamekl〉⌉n,m,k,l∈N. Application of Theorem 24 concludes
the proof.
The present paper contains two results interpretable as counterparts to Theorem 24,
as they allow to reduce finding equilibria for a large game to finding equilibria in several
smaller games; for mixed strategies, this will be a consequence of the main result pre-
sented in Subsection 4.3, the corresponding statement for pure strategies is given in the
next theorem:
Theorem 26. 1Puren+1 ≤2 〈MLPO2〉
n.
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Proof. We describe a Type-2-Machine M with n+1 input bands containing the relevant
payoffs, n pairs of two output bands, referred to as ia and ib for i ≤ n. In the ith step of
the computation, M will write 0 on every output tape. Let wik be the rational number
encoded by the ith natural number on the kth input tape. Then, for each k ≤ n, M
will write 1 on the output tape ka, iff wik < wi,k+j + 2
−i holds for all j ≤ n + 1 − k,
and write 1 on the output tape kb, iff wi,k+j < wi,k + 2
−i holds for all j ≤ n + 1 − k.
Considering the definition of ρ, for no i ≤ n the symbol 1 can be written on both ia and
ib, so the output of M is in the domain of 〈MLPO2〉
n.
Assume that first M and then 〈MLPO2〉
n is applied to an (n + 1)-matrix game.
Denote the input with (P1, P2, ..., Pn+1) and the output with w. If there is a k ≤ n, so
that w(k) = 1 and w(j) = 2 holds for j < k, then ρ(Pk) ≥ ρ(Pi) holds for all i ≤ n + 1,
so k is a valid output. If w(j) = 2 holds for all j ≤ n, then n+1 is a valid output, as no
other input value is greater than the n+ 1st.
As we have identifiedMLPO2 (or 1Pure2) as the basic building stone in the degree of
discontinuity of finding pure strategies, the following theorem will establish the missing
link in the relationship between finding pure strategies and multiple robust divisions:
Theorem 27. MLPO2 <2 rDiv.
Proof. rDiv 2 MLPO2 has already been proven. For the other direction, note that
there is a computable (and hence continuous) function turning arbitrary sequences of
natural numbers into ρ-names, so that a sequence is mapped to a ρ-name of 0 iff it is
0N. Thus we can assume that the input of MLPO2 is given as two ρ-names a, b of real
numbers, with at least one of them being 0. Consider rDiv(|a|, |a| + |b|). If this is not
a ρ-name of 1, then a must be a ρ-name of 0. If the output is not a ρ-name of 0, then b
must be a ρ-name of 0.
To sum up the results established sofar, we have:
⌈〈1Pure2〉
n⌉n∈N ≡2 1Pure ≡2 Pure <2 ⌈〈rDiv〉
n⌉n∈N ≤2 ZCorr
4.3. Problems reducible to ⌈〈rDiv〉n⌉n∈N
The goal of this subsection is to present a way of designing reductions to
⌈〈rDiv〉n⌉n∈N, and, in particular, to present a reduction from Nash. This equivalently
can be considered as the task to design algorithms for a Type-2-Machine capable of
making a finite number of independent queries to an oracle for rDiv. Due to Theorems
26, 27 also oracle calls to MLPOn are permitted.
We will start by providing a technical lemma similar to Lemma 9. Using the lemma,
we can prove that the Fourier-Motzkin-algorithm ([20]) for solving systems of linear
inequalities can be executed using continuous (even computable) operations and oracle
calls to rDiv.
Lemma 28. Let F be a multi-valued function defined on a strongly zero-
dimensional metrisable space X. Then F ≤2 ⌈〈rDiv〉
n⌉n∈N holds, iff there are k closed
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sets Ai, i ≤ k with X =
k⋃
i=1
Ai, so that for each i ≤ k, there is a multi-valued function
Gi ≤2 ⌈〈rDiv〉
n⌉n∈N with dom(G
i) = X, so that for each gi ∈ Gi there is an f i ∈ F
with f i|Ai = g
i
|Ai
.
Proof. One direction of the proof is trivial. For the other direction, assume that there
are continuous functions Ri, Qi for each i ≤ k with x 7→ Ri(x, q(Qi(x))) ∈ G
i for each
q ∈ rDiv. Further let D be the continuous function defined for the sets Ai as in the
proof to Lemma 9. Define the function Q = (D,Q1, . . . , Qk) and R(x, i, y1, . . . , yk) =
Ri(x, yi). Both Q and R are continuous, and satisfy x 7→ R(x, qˆ(Q(x))) ∈ F for qˆ ∈
〈MLPOk, 〈⌈〈rDiv〉
n⌉n∈N〉
k〉, so we have
F ≤2 〈MLPOk, 〈⌈〈rDiv〉
n⌉n∈N〉
k〉 ≡2 ⌈〈rDiv〉
n⌉n∈N.
Definition 29. The problem BLinIneqnm asks for a ρ
m-name of a vector v of reals,
so that Av ≤ b holds in addition to 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, given a ρnm-name for a matrix A and a
ρn-name for a vector b, provided that a solution exists. For simplicity, we assume that
Av ≤ b always contains 0 ≤ v ≤ 1. BLinIneq is the problem without fixed values n, m.
Theorem 30. BLinIneq ≤2 ⌈〈rDiv〉
z⌉z∈N.
Proof. As BLinIneq is expressible as a supremum, it suffices to prove
BLinIneqnm ≤2 ⌈〈rDiv〉
z⌉z∈N for all n,m ∈ N. For this, we use induction over m.
The case m = 0 is trivial, so we assume BLinIneqn(m−1) ≤2 ⌈〈rDiv〉
z⌉z∈N.
For each K ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, abbreviate KC := {1, . . . , n} \K. The set DK = {(A, b) |
∀k ∈ K ak1 ≥ 0 ∧ ∀l ∈ K
C al1 ≤ 0} is closed, and the union
⋃
K⊆{1,...,n}
DK covers the
domain of BLinIneqnm. So due to Lemma 28, it is sufficient to show that BLinIneqnm
restricted to DK is reducible to ⌈〈rDiv〉
z⌉z∈N for arbitrary K ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. In the next
step we assume K to be fixed. With the same argument we can assume |ak1| ≥ |a(k+1)1|
by renumbering the inequalities for each fixed sequence of increasing first coefficients.
Now we rewrite the given inequalities as ak1v1 ≤ bk −
m∑
i=2
akivi for k ∈ K and −bj +
m∑
i=2
ajivi ≤ −aj1v1 for j ∈ K
C . For each pair k ∈ K, j ∈ KC , the corresponding
inequalities can be multiplied by −aj1 respective ak1, and then contracted to:
ak1(−bj +
m∑
i=2
ajivi) ≤ −aj1(bk −
m∑
i=2
akivi)
Every solution to the newly created system of linear inequalities can be extended to a
solution to the original system by choosing a suitable value for v1. Due to the induction
assumption, such a solution can be obtained by making oracle calls to ⌈〈rDiv〉z⌉z∈N.
If all ak1 were known to be non-zero, after solutions for the vi, i ≥ 2 have been
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obtained, v1 is chosen as a solution to:
max
k∈K
−bj +
m∑
i=2
ajivi
−aj1
≤ v1 ≤ min
j∈KC
bk −
m∑
i=2
akivi
ak1
If a certain coefficient ak1 is 0, then the corresponding inequality does not restrict the
value of v1 at all, thus, divisions by 0 should be ignored in the expression above. However,
since we cannot determine whether a certain coefficient is 0 or not, this approach cannot
be employed by us.
Therefore, we evaluate all expressions determining v1 in the order of decreasing ab-
solute values of the coefficients, that is the expression ak1 is considered before a(k+1),1.
This ensures that all relevant inequalities are met. Thus, to obtain a solution for v1, we
would like to call
v1 = max(0,min(1, op1(rDiv(|b1 −
m∑
i=2
a1ivi|, |a11|), op2(|rDiv(b2 −
m∑
i=2
a2ivi|, |a21|), . . .
with opi = min for i ∈ K and opi = max else. As the |ak1| are ordered as a decreasing
sequence, values that arise arbitrary as result of a division by zero occur deeper inside
the nested structure than significant values. While they can influence the actual value
for v1 that is chosen, it still satisfies all inequalities, if this is possible. However, the
expression above contains nested calls to rDiv in form of the vi, 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
To solve the problem, one replaces v2 with the corresponding sequence used to compute
it, then v3, and so on. By moving the max and min operators outside, and unifying all
divisions, terms of the form rDiv(P,Q) remain, where P is a polynomial in aij , bj whose
degree does not exceed 2n, and Q is a polynomial in aij whose degree does not exceed
n. These can be evaluated by allowed oracle calls, and the max and min operators are
continuous.
As the problem BLinIneq is of considerable interest on its own, we shall note that
the converse statement to Theorem 30 is also true:
Theorem 31. ⌈〈rDiv〉z⌉z∈N ≤2 BLinIneq.
Proof. We have to show 〈rDiv〉n ≤2 BLinIneq for each n ∈ N. Given n pairs of reals
(pi, qi), consider the system of linear equalities given by Aii = qi, Aij = 0 for i 6= j and
bi = pi. The only solution is given by vi =
pi
qi
. By replacing every equality with two
inequalities, the needed reduction is found.
By adapting [21, Algorithm 3.4] and applying Lemma 28 and Theorem 30 we proceed
to prove the main theorem of this subsection. Again, the reasoning directly extends to
more than two players.
Theorem 32. Nash ≤2 ⌈〈rDiv〉
z⌉z∈N.
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Proof. By the same reasoning as above, since Nash is the supremum
⌈Nashnm⌉n,m∈N, it suffices to show Nashnm ≤2 ⌈〈rDiv〉
z⌉z∈N for arbitrary n,m ∈ N.
By the best response condition ([21, Proposition 3.1]), a pair of mixed strategies (x, y)
is a Nash equilibrium of a game if each pure strategy played with positive probability in
x (in y) is a best response against y (against x). This condition can be formalized by
noting that the following set is the set of games and their Nash equilibria with support
in I, J :
GˆI,J =
{(A,B, x, y) | j, k ∈ J l /∈ J (xTB)j = (x
TB)k ≥ (x
TB)l yl = 0 i, p ∈ I
q /∈ I (Ay)i = (Ay)p ≥ (Ay)q xq = 0}
The set GˆI,J is closed, and so is its projection GI,J = {(A,B) | ∃x, y (A,B, x, y) ∈ GˆI,J}.
As every game has a Nash equilibrium, the sets GI,J cover the domain of Nash, so we
can apply Lemma 28. To recover the Nash equilibrium (x, y) from I, J the corresponding
system of linear inequalities has to be solved, which is reducible to ⌈〈rDiv〉z⌉z∈N as
established in Theorem 30.
Corollary 33. ZCorr ≡2 Corr ≡2 ZNash ≡2 Nash ≡2 ⌈〈rDiv〉
n⌉n∈N.
The same technique applied in the proof of Theorem 30 can also be used to show that
Gaussian Elimination can be reduced to ⌈〈rDiv〉n⌉n∈N. This shows that the reduction
of Gaussian Elimination to the rank of a matrix given in [22] is strict, taking into
consideration Corollary 39.
5. Additional Results
5.1. Nash and Sep
To shed further light on the degree of discontinuity of Nash, we will compare it to the
problem Sep studied in [23].
Definition 34. f ∈ Sep holds, iff f is a function from
{(p, q) ∈ NN ×NN | ∀n,m ∈ N p(n) 6= q(m)}
to NN satisfying f(p(n)) = 0 and f(q(n)) = 1 for all n ∈ N.
The problem Sep was shown to be equivalent to finding an infinite path in an infinite
binary tree and extending a linear functional from a subspace of a Banach space to the
complete space following the Hahn-Banach Theorem. Sep can be reduced to {C1}, which
is defined through C1(p)(n) = 1, iff there is an i ∈ N with p(i) = n and C1(p)(n) = 0
else. The function C1 has been introduced in [15]. In [24, Theorem 5.5], it was proven
that a function is
∑0
2-measurable, iff it is reducible to C1.
In [23], {cf} 2 Sep was shown, which can directly to extended to prove {f} 2 Sep
for all discontinuous functions f . In the following, we will prove that Nash is strictly
reducible to Sep, thereby obtaining a lower bound for Sep. For this aim, we need the
level of Sep.
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Theorem 35. Lev2(Sep) does not exist.
Proof. We have to prove that for every f ∈ Sep, Lev2(f) does not exist. For notation,
we define Rp = {p(n) | n ∈ N}. We study the points (p, q) where f might be continuous.
First we assume there exists an n ∈ N \ (Rp ∪ Rq). Define pk through pk(i) = p(i) for
i 6= k and pk(k) = n, and qk through qk(i) = q(i) for i 6= k and qk(k) = n. Then
lim
k→∞
(pk, q) = lim
k→∞
(p, qk) = (p, q) holds. However, f(pk, q)(n) = 0 and f(p, qk)(n) = 1,
so f cannot be continuous in (p, q). Whether f is continuous in a point (p, q) with
Rp ∪Rq = N depends on f .
Rephrasing the considerations above, we know cl{(p, q) | Rq ∪Rp 6= N, Rq ∩Rp = ∅} ⊆
L21(f). However, for each (p, q) with Rp∪Rq = N, define pk through pk(i) = p(i) for i ≤ k,
and pk(i) = p(k) for i ≥ k, analogously define qk through qk(i) = q(i) for i ≤ k, and
qk(i) = q(k) for i ≥ k. Then lim
k→∞
(pk, qk) = (p, q), and for each k, Rpk∪Rqk is even finite.
Thus, L1(f) = L0(f) follows. Transfinite induction easily proves L
2
α(f) = L
2
0(f) 6= ∅ for
all ordinal numbers α.
Due to the behaviour of the level under formation of products ([17]) and suprema
([9], [16]), we know Lev2(Nash) = ω, where ω is the smallest infinite ordinal. This is
sufficient to establish Sep 2 Nash by [9, Theorem 5.7].
Theorem 36. rDiv ≤2 Sep.
Proof. [To Theorem 36] Let (a, b) be the input for rDiv. We describe a machine trans-
forming it to an input for Sep. The machine has two different modes, starting in the
first one. In each stage i, write 1 on the first and 2 on the second output tape. Then
test ν(bi) > 2
−i+1. If yes, change to mode 2, otherwise continue with stage i+ 1.
In the following description of the second mode, let i0 denote the stage of the first
mode during which the switch occurred. We will use the following inequality:∣∣∣∣ν(ai)ν(bi) −
ρ(a)
ρ(b)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2−[i−2(i0+1)]
The stages in the second mode are indexed by [i, j] (employing a monotone bijective
pairing [ ] : N× N→ N). In each stage, test |ν(ak)
ν(bk)
− ν(j)| < 2−i−1 with k = i+ 2i0 + 3.
If the answer is yes, write 2 + [i, j] on the second output tape, otherwise write 2 + [i, j]
on the first tape. Note that yes also implies |ρ(a)
ρ(b) − ν(j)| < 2
i.
It remains to describe a second Type-2-Machine which recovers a ρ-name for ρa
ρb
from
the result w of the applying of Sep to the output of the machine described above. For
that, we fix a function κ : N→ N with the following property:
∀i ∀k ∃j ≤ κ(i) |ν(k)− ν(j)| < 2−i−1
If the numbering ν is chosen in a way that no computable κ exists, κ is assumed to be
given by an oracle, this still allows a continuous reduction.
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In the stage i of our second machine, test w2+[i,j] = 1? for each j from 1 to κ(i). If a
j is found which yields yes, then write j on the output tape and proceed with the next
stage. If the answer is always no, repeat the last output forever (always write 1 if there
has been no output yet).
If ρ(b) 6= 0, then the first machine will eventually switch to the second mode. There,
all 2−i-approximations ν(j) for ρ(a)
ρ(b) are computed. Due to the properties of κ, at least
one of them fulfills j ≤ κ(i), and is found and printed by the second machine. If ρ(b) = 0,
then the second machine is still guaranteed to produce a valid ρ-name.
Theorem 37. 〈Sep, Sep〉 ≡2 Sep.
Proof. One direction is trivial. For the other, define the continuous function G :
NN×NN → NN via G(p, q)(2k) = 2p(k) and G(p, q)(2k+1) = 2q(k)+1. Define the contin-
uous function F : NN → NN×NN through F (p) = (q1, q2), where q1(i) = p(2i) and q2(i) =
p(2i + 1). Now observe
〈Sep, Sep〉(p1, q1, p2, q2) = F (Sep(G(p1, p2), G(q1, q2))).
Corollary 38. Nash <2 Sep.
Proof. Due to Theorem 32 and the properties of suprema, we just have to show 〈rDiv〉n ≤2
Sep for all n ∈ N. Theorem 36 yields 〈rDiv〉n ≤2 〈Sep〉n, repeated application of The-
orem 37 yields 〈Sep〉n ≡2 Sep.
Corollary 39. {f} 2 Nash for all discontinuous functions f .
5.2. The Level of Nash22
The simplest non-trivial bi-matrix games, 2 × 2 games, have already been investigated
from a constructive point of view in [25]. Among other results, [25] contains the con-
structive analogue to the reduction MLPO2 ≤2 Nash22, and the constructive analogue
to determine a subset of L0(Nash22) \ L1(Nash22), that is the set where Nash equilib-
ria are continuous. We will produce the TTE-counterpart by investigating the Level of
Nash22.
Theorem 40. Lev(Nash22) = 4.
Proof. [To Theorem 40] A strategy in this setting can be describe by merely a single
real number, the probability of the first pure strategy to be chosen. This allows to
condense the information given in the game: Row-player tries to maximize x(c+dy) and
column-player tries to maximize y(e+ fy) with c = a11 − a12 − a21 + a22, d = a12 − a22,
e = b11 − b12 − b21 + b22 and f = b21 − b22. The table in the Appendix defines a
function in Nash22 depending on these value which obviously has Level 4, establishing
Lev(Nash22) ≤ 4. It is straight-forward to check that all points of discontinuity of this
function are points of discontinuity of every choice function for Nash22.
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A. Appendix
c > 0 d+ c > 0 e > 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c > 0 d+ c > 0 e > 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c > 0 d+ c > 0 e < 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c > 0 d+ c > 0 e < 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c > 0 d+ c < 0 e > 0 e+ f > 0 0 1
c > 0 d+ c < 0 e > 0 e+ f < 0 0 1
c > 0 d+ c < 0 e < 0 e+ f > 0 −e
f
−c
d
c > 0 d+ c < 0 e < 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c < 0 d+ c > 0 e > 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c < 0 d+ c > 0 e > 0 e+ f < 0 −e
f
−c
d
c < 0 d+ c > 0 e < 0 e+ f > 0 0 0
c < 0 d+ c > 0 e < 0 e+ f < 0 0 0
c < 0 d+ c < 0 e > 0 e+ f > 0 0 1
c < 0 d+ c < 0 e > 0 e+ f < 0 0 1
c < 0 d+ c < 0 e < 0 e+ f > 0 0 0
c < 0 d+ c < 0 e < 0 e+ f < 0 0 0
c = 0 d+ c > 0 e > 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c = 0 d+ c > 0 e > 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c = 0 d+ c > 0 e < 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c = 0 d+ c > 0 e < 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c = 0 d+ c < 0 e > 0 e+ f > 0 0 1
c = 0 d+ c < 0 e > 0 e+ f < 0 0 1
c = 0 d+ c < 0 e < 0 e+ f > 0 0 0
c = 0 d+ c < 0 e < 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c > 0 d+ c = 0 e > 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c > 0 d+ c = 0 e > 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c > 0 d+ c = 0 e < 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c > 0 d+ c = 0 e < 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c < 0 d+ c = 0 e > 0 e+ f > 0 0 1
c < 0 d+ c = 0 e > 0 e+ f < 0 0 1
c < 0 d+ c = 0 e < 0 e+ f > 0 0 0
c < 0 d+ c = 0 e < 0 e+ f < 0 0 0
c > 0 d+ c > 0 e = 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c > 0 d+ c > 0 e = 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c > 0 d+ c < 0 e = 0 e+ f > 0 0 1
c > 0 d+ c < 0 e = 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c < 0 d+ c > 0 e = 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c < 0 d+ c > 0 e = 0 e+ f < 0 0 0
c < 0 d+ c < 0 e = 0 e+ f > 0 0 1
c < 0 d+ c < 0 e = 0 e+ f < 0 0 0
c > 0 d+ c > 0 e > 0 e+ f = 0 1 1
c > 0 d+ c > 0 e < 0 e+ f = 0 1 0
c > 0 d+ c < 0 e > 0 e+ f = 0 0 1
c > 0 d+ c < 0 e < 0 e+ f = 0 1 0
c < 0 d+ c > 0 e > 0 e+ f = 0 1 1
c < 0 d+ c > 0 e < 0 e+ f = 0 0 0
c < 0 d+ c < 0 e > 0 e+ f = 0 0 1
c < 0 d+ c < 0 e < 0 e+ f = 0 0 0
c = 0 d+ c = 0 e > 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c = 0 d+ c = 0 e > 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c = 0 d+ c = 0 e < 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c = 0 d+ c = 0 e < 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c = 0 d+ c > 0 e = 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c = 0 d+ c > 0 e = 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c = 0 d+ c < 0 e = 0 e+ f > 0 0 0
c = 0 d+ c < 0 e = 0 e+ f < 0 0 0
c = 0 d+ c > 0 e > 0 e+ f = 0 1 1
c = 0 d+ c > 0 e < 0 e+ f = 0 1 1
c = 0 d+ c < 0 e > 0 e+ f = 0 0 1
c = 0 d+ c < 0 e < 0 e+ f = 0 0 0
c < 0 d+ c = 0 e = 0 e+ f > 0 0 1
c < 0 d+ c = 0 e = 0 e+ f < 0 0 0
c > 0 d+ c = 0 e = 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c > 0 d+ c = 0 e = 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c < 0 d+ c = 0 e > 0 e+ f = 0 0 1
c < 0 d+ c = 0 e < 0 e+ f = 0 0 0
c > 0 d+ c = 0 e > 0 e+ f = 0 1 1
c > 0 d+ c = 0 e < 0 e+ f = 0 1 0
c > 0 d+ c > 0 e = 0 e+ f = 0 1 1
c > 0 d+ c < 0 e = 0 e+ f = 0 0 1
c < 0 d+ c > 0 e = 0 e+ f = 0 1 1
c < 0 d+ c < 0 e = 0 e+ f = 0 0 1
c = 0 d+ c = 0 e = 0 e+ f > 0 1 1
c = 0 d+ c = 0 e = 0 e+ f < 0 1 0
c = 0 d+ c = 0 e < 0 e+ f = 0 1 0
c = 0 d+ c = 0 e > 0 e+ f = 0 1 1
c = 0 d+ c > 0 e = 0 e+ f = 0 1 1
c = 0 d+ c < 0 e = 0 e+ f = 0 0 1
c < 0 d+ c = 0 e = 0 e+ f = 0 0 1
c > 0 d+ c = 0 e = 0 e+ f = 0 1 1
c = 0 d+ c = 0 e = 0 e+ f = 0 1 0
